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9IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

RODNEY DONALD CARTER,

Case No. 900303-CA
Priority #2

:

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This

appeal

is

from

a

final

judgment

and

conviction

rendered against appellant in the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy,
presiding, for Possession of Cocaine with Intent to Distribute, a
second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-378(1)(a)(iv) (1953, as amended).
this case pursuant

This court has jurisdiction over

to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp.

1990).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether

the

officers

had

reasonable

suspicion

to

detain and search appellant at the airport.
2.

Whether,

absent

reasonable

suspicion,

appellant

knowingly and voluntarily consented to the search of his person

and bags, consistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution.

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The Constitutional provisions relevant to a determination
of this case are:
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses, papers and effects
against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The

appellant,

Rodney

D.

Carter,

was

charged

with

Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a
second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-378(1)(a)(iv) (1953, as amended) (R. 6).
On March 20, 1990, the trial court convicted appellant
after a bench trial (R. 130).

Thereafter, on May 6, 1990, the

court sentenced appellant to a term of one to fifteen years in
the Utah State Prison.

The said sentence was suspended in lieu

of thirty-six months probation under the supervision of Adult
Probation and Parole (R. 142).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 17, 1989, Detective Bart Palmer of the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Office and Lieutenant Dave Fullmer of the Utah
State Narcotics Agency were on duty at the Salt Lake International Airport.

Their primary responsibility was to observe

airline passengers in an effort to locate drug couriers (Transcript of November 11, 1989 Hearing, at p. 36-37, 57 [hereinafter
"Tr."]).
At approximately 5:15 P.M. on that day, both officers were
observing passengers as they deplaned from an America West flight
that had originated in Las Vegas (Tr. 37). As they watched the
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passengers enter the concourse, they noticed appellant, a black
male, among the group (Tr. 37),

Both officers noted that he

scanned the crowd as he walked into the terminal (Tr. 37).
then turned and walked up the concourse.

He

As he continued up the

concourse, he turned and looked back in the direction of the
officers approximately three times (Tr. 38).
Both
concourse,
39).

officers

then

began

following

appellant

up

the

but temporarily lost visual contact with him (Tr.

As they approached the "top" of the concourse, Palmer

observed him in the pay telephone area to his left (Tr. 39).
Palmer then proceeded to that immediate area and took a position
in the cubicle next to appellant (Tr. 39). Neither officer could
hear appellant speak to anyone, although he appeared to have been
attempting a phone call (Tr. 40).

Appellant was in the phone

area for approximately "a minute or two" (Tr. 40).
Appellant

then

hung

up

terminal escalator (Tr. 40).

the phone

and

walked

to the

Once he got on the escalator, he

quickened his pace and began walking past people as he rode down
(Tr. 40).
walked

Upon reaching the bottom level of the terminal, he

quickly

out

the exit

doors, without

stopping

by the

baggage claim area (Tr. 40). Palmer testified that he had to run
in order to catch up with appellant, just as he was getting into
a taxi (Tr. 43).
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Once

he

caught

up

with

appellant,

Palmer

identified

himself and asked appellant if he could speak with him (Tr. 44).
Appellant responded in the affirmative and Palmer asked to see
his plane ticket (Tr. 43). Appellant stated that he thought he
had left the ticket on the plane but searched his carry-on bag
for it (Tr. 43). Appellant did produce an old ticket under the
name of Warren Carter, which Palmer looked at and then returned
to appellant (Tr. 52).

Pursuant to Palmer's request, appellant

checked his bag for identification, but was unable to find any
(Tr. 43).
drugs.

Palmer then asked appellant if he was carrying any

Appellant stated that he was not (Tr. 45). Palmer next

asked if he could search appellant's bag himself and appellant
stated that he could (Tr. 46).
As he was searching appellant's bag, Palmer noticed that
appellant was conversing with Fullmer, who had arrived on the
scene when Palmer asked appellant for identification (Tr. 47-48).
Fullmer stated that, as he observed appellant bend over to look
in his bag for identification, he noticed a line above his waist
running around his back (Tr. 70).

Fullmer noted that appellant

was wearing a black semi-dress shirt and that the "line" was
noticeably protruding through the shirt as he bent over (Tr. 71).
After making the observation, Fullmer asked appellant if
he could search him (Tr. 72).

Appellant responded,
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n

go ahead"

and turned his back to Fullmer (Tr. 72).

Fullmer conducted the

search and discovered two packages in the lower abdomen area
which later were discovered to contain approximately 453 grams of
cocaine (Tr. 78).

Based on this discovery, Fullmer and Palmer

escorted appellant to their airport office where he was formally
placed

under arrest

(Tr. 77-79).

Appellant

subsequently was

charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to
Distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE
ANN. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953, as amended) (R. 6).
Prior to trial, the court denied appellant's motion to
suppress, on the ground that the appellant's failure to produce
an identification, coupled with the fact that a tape was strapped
around his waist, furnished the officers reasonable suspicion to
search him.

The court further found that appellant voluntarily

consented to the search (R. 123-24) (Addendum, p. 5).
At trial, the court convicted appellant and thereafter
sentenced him to a prison term of one to fifteen years.

The

prison sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on probation for thirty-six months (R. 130, 142).

The instant appeal

challenges the court's findings and conviction.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant

submits

that

the

trial

court

committed

reversible error by denying his motion to suppress, which argued
that the arresting officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop
appellant at the airport.

The fact that cocaine was subsequently

discovered

can

on

appellant

not

justify

the

illegal

stop.

Further, appellant's alleged consent to the search was involuntary and was obtained as fruit of the prior police misconduct of
stopping appellant without having an articulable suspicion to
believe he was involved in criminal activity.

This court should

therefore remand this case to district court and order that the
evidence illegally obtained be suppressed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE SEIZED BY THE POLICE OFFICERS, WHO LACKED
A REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO DETAIN
APPELLANT.
Standard of Review.

This court reviews determinations

underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error.
State v. Robinson, 140 UAR 16 (Ct. App. 1990), at 6; see also
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d

1255, 1258

(Utah 1987).

Appellant

submits that the trial court in the instant case clearly erred in
denying appellant's motion.
- 7 -

At the outset, appellant acknowledges that police officers
can approach citizens and initiate a "consensual" confrontation,
and that as long as there is no detention or seizure, there is no
Fourth Amendment violation.
(1983).

Florida v. Royerf 460 U.S. 491, 498

However, it is appellant's contention that what began as

a "consensual" encounter in the instant case quickly escalated
into a Fourth Amendment detention or seizure.
executed
suspicion.

without

benefit

of

a

Such detention was

reasonable

and

articulable

Thus, appellant's Fourth Amendment rights, as well as

his rights under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution,
were violated.
In Florida v. Royer, the Supreme Court dealt with facts
similar to those present

in the instant case.

In Royer, the

defendant was observed by two narcotics officers at Miami International Airport where he purchased a one-way ticket to New York
City.

After concluding that he fit the so-called "drug courier

profile," the officers

approached him and asked

moment to speak with them.

if he had a

Royer responded in the affirmative.

Upon request, Royer produced an airline ticket and his driver's
license.

The ticket and his baggage identification

indicated

that his name was Holt, while his driver's license identified him
as Royer.

When asked about this discrepancy, Royer explained

that a friend had made the reservation for him.

At this point,

according to the officers, Royer became noticeably nervous.
- 8 -

Without

returning

his

ticket

or

identification,

the

officers asked Royer to accompany them to a large storage closet,
which he did.

Upon arriving there, they asked him if they could

search his luggage.

Without responding verbally, he produced a

key and opened his suitcase, which contained controlled substances.
invalid

The Court held that Royer's consent to the search was
because

the

officers

had

effectively

"arrested"

him

without probable cause when they asked him to go to the "closet"
without returning his ticket or driverfs license to him.

Ld. at

503.
The Royer

Court established

a three-step

analysis for

courts to apply in police-citizen encounters:
The
first tier of police-citizen
encounters
involves no restraint of the liberty of the citizen
involved, but rather, the voluntary cooperation of
the citizen is elicited through non-coercive questioning. This type of contact does not rise to the
level of a seizure and therefore is outside the
realm of fourth amendment protection. The second
category, the investigative stop, is limited to
brief, non-intrusive detention during a frisk for
weapons or preliminary questioning. This type of
encounter is considered a "seizure" sufficient to
invoke fourth amendment safeguards, but because of
its less intrusive character requires only that the
stopping officer have specific and articulable
facts sufficient to give rise to reasonable
suspicion that a person has committed or is
committing a crime.
The third type of policecitizen
encounters,
arrest,
are
[sic]
characterized by highly intrusive or lengthy search
or detention. The fourth amendment requires that
an arrest be justified by probable cause to
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believe that a person
committing a crime.

has

committed

or

is

United States v. Armstrong, 722 F.2d 681, 684 (11th Cir. 1984)
(citing Rover, 460 U.S. at 497-98).
In its holding, the Rover Court emphasized the legitimacy
of

those

situations

where

"law

enforcement

officers

do not

violate the fourth amendment by merely approaching an individual
on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is
willing to answer some questions by putting questions to him if
the person is willing to listen. . . ."
498.

Id., citing Royery at

However, the Court then observed that the encounter with

Royer lost its consensual nature at that point where the officers
identified
accompany

themselves as narcotics officers
them

to the office while

driver's license.

and asked him to

retaining

his ticket and

The Court stated that the circumstances there

clearly amounted "to a show of official authority such that a
reasonable person would not have believed that he was free to
leave/

Rover,

460 U.S. at

502, quoting

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
the stop was "more

United

States v.

The Court then ruled that

intrusive than necessary to effectuate an

investigative detention otherwise authorized by the Terry line of
cases."

Id. at 504.

Finally, the Court found that there was

actually no probable cause to arrest Royer until after he had
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been taken to the "office" and the suitcase had been opened.

Id.

at 507.
Appellant submits that the facts in the instant case are
very close to those in Royer.

First, even if the initial stop

was consensual, because appellant agreed to speak to Palmer, it
lost its "consensual nature" when Palmer persisted in questioning
him after he had been unable to produce his current ticket and
had already provided a prior ticket.
sual police-citizen

encounter

At that point, the consen-

had become, at

detention for preliminary questioning.

least, a brief

It is clear that the

officers from that point had neither a reasonable suspicion nor
probable cause based upon their observations of appellant,,
When

Palmer

then

began

searching

appellant's

bag,

admittedly with the hope of discovering contraband, the detention
was clearly of a non-consensual nature, despite the allegation
that appellant allowed him to search (Tr. 46).

Consensual type

encounters clearly lose their voluntary nature when police begin
searching.

That is because the act of searching automatically

signals the ending of questions and answers and the beginning of
a new stage in the encounter.

This "detention" stage requires a

reasonable suspicion which neither officer had at that point.
Although Fullmer later had sufficient information on which to
make

an arrest, that

information was the end result of the
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unlawful detention.

Thus, the evidence discovered at that point

should have been suppressed.

See Wong Sun v. United Statesr 371

U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Arroyo, 136 UAR 13 (Utah 1990).
In
maintains

making

the

above

that when Palmer

mentioned

argument,

initially confronted

appellant

him, neither

officer had a reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to stop
or arrest.

Support for this position is found in State v. Sery,

758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), where this court decided an
airport "profile" case with facts similar to those in the instant
case.
In Seryf the defendant arrived in Salt Lake City at 11:05
a.m. on a Delta flight from Florida.

He was carrying a suitcase.

There was nothing unique or unusual about his appearance or
dress.

Id. at 936.

When he arrived at the gate area he looked

around, waited for other passengers to pass him and then started
walking along the concourse.

He then looked around, went into a

snack bar, and emerged a few minutes later with a soft drink in
his hand.

He proceeded across the hallway and into the pay phone

area, where he entered one of the cubicles and sat down.

While

holding a phone receiver, he twice stood up and looked over the
partition.

Approximately three to five minutes later, he left

that area and proceeded in the direction of the baggage claim
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area, using a different route to leave than the one used to get
there.

At that point he was stopped by airport drug enforcement

agents.

Id. at 936.

The agents, who were actually conducting a drug courier
seminar

for

the

Salt

Lake

City Police Department, had been

observing defendant and had decided to follow him while several
trainees watched.

Ld. at 936. The agents initially asked to see

the defendant's airline ticket, which he produced.

However, the

name on the ticket was not his. The agents asked for identification, which defendant stated he did not have.

However, he volun-

teered to them that the name on the ticket was not his and that
it was incorrect due to an error made by Delta.

Without asking

for his proper identity, the agents asked the defendant for his
destination, to which he replied Evanston, Wyoming.
asked if they could search his bag.
leave.

They then

He refused and they let him

Id. at 937.
The

defendant

then

left, went

down

baggage claim and then exited the terminal.

the

escalator

to

He re-entered the

building, looked around the baggage claim area and left again.
Meanwhile, after

releasing

the defendant, one of

the agents

checked out the call back phone number left on the defendant's
reservation and discovered that it had been changed to a nonlisted number.

They then found the defendant and detained him

- 13 -

while a drug detection dog was located.

The defendant was taken

back inside the terminal and the dog alerted to his bag, which
contained cocaine.
In reversing the trial court's denial of the motion to
suppress, this court held that "the articulable objective facts
known to [the officer] when he seized [defendant] did not support
a

reasonable

activity."

suspicion

Ld. at 942.

that

[he]

was

engaged

in

criminal

This court then noted the seven facts

relied on by the state in support of the reasonableness of the
stop:
(1) [Defendant] arrived from Florida; (2) waited a
few minutes at the gate and looked nervously around
there and before entering the snack bar; (3) went
to a telephone booth and twice stood up and looked
in the direction of the officers; (4) took a
strange route from the phone booth area back to the
concourse; (5) possessed a plane ticket on which he
claimed his name had been inaccurately recorded;
(6) told [the agent] he had no identification on
him; and (7) left a telephone number . . . that had
been changed to an unpublished number.
Id. at 943.
After analyzing each of the proffered factors, the court
concluded that although trained police officers may be "able to
perceive an articulate meaning in given conduct which would be
wholly

innocent

to the untrained

observer,"

the officer had

failed to show that in the context of the case before it. Id. at
946.
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There are also a number of other cases from both the
Supreme Court
sufficiency

of

and the Tenth Circuit
articulable

facts

to

addressing
establish

suspicion in the context of an airport stop.

the
a

issue of
reasonable

For example, in

Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam) , the Court
found insufficient the facts that the government relied upon in
that case to support probable cause: The defendant had flown from
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, a source city for cocaine.

He had

arrived early in the morning, when police activity was at a low
ebb.

The defendant had not checked any luggage.

The defendant

and his companion were attempting to hide the fact that they were
together.

See id. at 441.

Similarly, in United States v. Santillanes, 848 F.2d 1103
(10th Cir. 1988), the court found the government's justification
unpersuasive to support reasonable suspicion.

In Santillanesr

the defendant was on release pending trial on a drug charge.

He

was observed deplaning by the officer who had arrested him on
that first charge.

When the defendant attempted to avoid the

officer, he was physically grabbed and held by the officer.
reason for detaining the defendant was that the

The

officer believed

that by leaving the jurisdiction, the defendant had violated the
conditions of his release.

In New Mexico (the district where the

case originated), it was not a crime to violate conditions of
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release.

The court held that the defendant's Fourth Amendment

rights had been violated by that detention, because at the time
of

the detention, there were no facts to establish that the

defendant was engaged in the commission of a crime.

Lei. at 1109.

However, in United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581
(1989), the Court found that the presence of several "profile"
established a reasonable suspicion to support detention.
defendant in Sokolow was about twenty-five years old.

The

In July,

1984, he paid cash for two round-trip tickets from Honolulu,
Hawaii, to Miami, Florida, a source city for drugs.
date was left open on the tickets.

He paid for the tickets (the

cost was $2,100) from a roll of $20 bills.
contained about $4,000.
dant was

wearing

The return

The roll of bills

At the time of the purchase the defen-

a black

jump suit with gold

jewelry.

He

appeared to be very nervous and was accompanied by a woman.

The

name that was given at the ticket counter did not match the name
under

which

the

telephone

number

he

had

given

was

listed.

Neither the defendant nor the woman checked any luggage.

The

defendant stayed in Miami only 48 hours even though the round
trip took 20 hours.

During the return trip, the defendant was

wearing the same clothing and appeared to be very nervous.

Two

narcotics detector dogs subsequently alerted to defendant's bags.
Id. at 1583-84.
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In

reversing

the

court

of

appeals1

finding

that

the

officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, the
Court noted that none of the facts articulated by the government,
standing alone, could justify reasonable suspicion.

However,

under a totality-of-the-circumstances test, the Court found that
the facts established reasonable suspicion that defendant was
engaged or about to engage in a criminal activity.

See id. at

1586.1
Sokolow, however, is inapposite under the circumstances of
the instant case.

The officers in the instant case had nothing

comparable to the suspicion articulated by the Sokolow officers.
As earlier pointed out, this case is more analogous to Sery than
to Sokolow.

In Sery, this court held that circumstances similar

to those of the instant case do not support reasonable suspicion

See also Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 4 (1984) (initial
encounter was consensual and did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, where one defendant ran when officers observed them
and two other defendants gave the officers contradictory statements); United States v. Bell, 892 F.2d 959 (10th Cir. 1989)
(initial encounter consensual where the officers asked the
defendant what was in his zipped coat pocket and defendant
responded by reaching up and unzipping the pocket).
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required under the fourth Amendment.

See Sery, 758 P.2d at 942.

The facts relied on by the officers in the instant case
are even weaker than those provided in Sery.

Appellant's conduct

consisted of looking around the concourse, using the telephones,
walking quickly down the escalator,3 and then walking quickly to
the taxi area without stopping by the baggage claim area.

Such

conduct, without more, was "wholly innocent" and should not be
made otherwise merely because the officers later on discovered
cocaine in his possession.
they

approached

appellant,

suspicion to detain him.

See Sery, 758 P.2d at 944-45.
neither

officer

had

When

reasonable

And although the confrontation began as

consensual in nature, it quickly became more intrusive and less
voluntary.

At that point it became a seizure, one in which in

view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would have
believed

that

he was

not

free

to leave.

United

States v.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); State v. Sery.
It is important to note that the Utah Supreme Court has
abandoned "tailgaiting" United States Supreme Court cases and has
finally effectuated its oft-repeated willingness to rely more on
the State Constitution and cases interpreting it. See State v.
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (Utah Constitution provides
greater protection than the Fourth Amendment).
Thus, even if
this Court finds Sokolow relevant to disposing the instant case,
appellant submits that Sery, rather than Sokolow, should control
the outcome of the question whether the officers had reasonable,
articulable suspicion in stopping him.
3
The State acknowledged that this conduct is clearly consistent
with innocent behavior (Tr. 60).
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Thus,

the

trial

court

clearly

erred

in

refusing

to

suppress the evidence seized from appellant as violative of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah

Constitution.

This

court

should

therefore

reverse

appellant1s conviction.

POINT II
APPELLANT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO THE SEARCH
OF HIS PERSON AND BAGS.
A

critical

issue

in

this

case

is

whether

appellant

voluntarily consented to the search of his person and bags as
found by the trial court (R. 123-24).

A review of the case law

dealing with this issue is thus appropriate.
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the
Supreme Court examined the "consent exception" to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

In that case, the Court

noted that one of the well-established exceptions to the warrant
and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment
search conducted pursuant to voluntary consent.

is a

The question in

Schneckloth dealt with what the prosecution must prove to demonstrate that a consent was "voluntarily" given.
that the test to be applied
test.

The Court held

is the traditional voluntariness

The prosecution carries the burden of proving that the
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consent was freely and voluntarily given and was not the result
of duress or coercion.

Voluntariness, the Court heldf

is a

question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.
The Court then discussed some of the factors to be considered
when applying this totality-of-the-circumstances test: the defendant's intelligence, whether or not the defendant was in custody,
the nature of the police questioning and the environment in which
the search took place, the defendant's knowledge of his right to
withhold consent, and any other circumstances that weigh on the
issue of voluntariness.
The question of coercion as it relates to a consent to
search at the airport has also been addressed by the Supreme
Court.

The primary issues raised in United States v. Mendenhall

were whether airport authorities had illegally stopped the defendant

and whether she then voluntarily consented

agents to an office.

to accompany

The Court found that the authorities acted

properly in stopping and asking the defendant for identification.
The Court went on to find that the defendant had consented to go
to

the office

of

the Drug Enforcement

Administration.

The

officers had not kept the defendant's airline ticket or identification.

The Court concluded that the officers' actions could

be reasonably interpreted by the defendant to imply that she was
not required to accompany them.
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Conversely, in Florida v. Royery

supra, the Court held

that the stop of an individual on less than probable cause cannot
justify a detention in a small room by two police officers.

In

Royer, the officers had retained the defendant's airline ticket
and identification.

They then had his luggage brought to the

room where he was held.

The Court found that such a situation

would result in the defendant's belief that he was under arrest.
Because the defendant had not been informed that he was being
detained, the Court concluded that the encounter had lost its
consensual nature.
tical

matter, Royer

The Court went on to hold that, as a pracwas under

arrest.

Since

there

probable cause to arrest him, the search was illegal.

was no

The Court

then observed that:
[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent,
the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely
and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of
lawful authority.
Royer, 460 U.S. at 497.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed a
similar issue in United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th
Cir. 1985).

In that case, the defendant had been stopped for

speeding in New Mexico.

He produced a Virginia driver's license.

The car was not registered to the defendant.
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The officer ran an

NCIC check to determine if the vehicle had been reported stolen.
That check was negative.

He then requested assistance from a

backup officer, stating that he had a "gut instinct" that the
defendant was transporting narcotics.

The officer returned to

the defendant's car and told him he could either plead not guilty
or

sign

the

ticket.

When defendant

signed

the ticket, the

officer asked him to step out of the car and then asked if he
could

inspect

the trunk.

During

the inspection, the officer

found that some of the screws in the molding had been tampered
with.

The officer then requested that the defendant accompany

him to a nearby town, which the defendant agreed to do.

At no

time had the officer returned the defendant's driver's license,
the vehicle registration, or the traffic ticket.

At the police

station, the defendant allegedly consented to the search of the
car.
In
defendant's

analyzing

whether

the

trip

consent, the Tenth Circuit

was

made

employed

with

a three tier

analysis:
(1) There
must
be
clear
and
positive
testimony that the consent was "unequivocal and
specific" and "freely and intelligently given";
(2) the government must prove consent was
given without duress or coercion, express or
implied; and
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the

(3) the
court
indulge
every
reasonable
presumption against the waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and there must be convincing
evidence that such rights were waived.
See
Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1453.
In a recent case, State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990), this court relied on Tenth Circuit case law for
the test to be followed in determining if a consent is voluntary.
This court noted that the test for voluntariness must be based on
the totality of the circumstances of each case.

To determine if

a consent is voluntary, this court specifically cited the threepart test from the Tenth Circuit cases.
In

the

instant

case,

unequivocal and specific.

the

See id. at 888.

consent

to

search

was not

It is important to note that appellant

was alone with two police officers, whom he believed would not
allow him to leave unless he yielded to their demands.

Appellant

was never informed of his right not to consent to the searches.
Thus, he could not have freely and voluntarily consented to the
searches as found by the trial court.
Further, as earlier mentioned, the Utah Supreme Court has
recognized that the Utah Constitution provides broader protection
4
than the Fourth Amendment.

See supra note 2.
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In State v. Arroyo, 136 UAR 13 (Utah 1990), the court
analyzed the standard for determining the validity of an alleged
consent.

In Arroyo, a Utah Highway Patrol Trooper had stopped

the defendant's vehicle on a freeway after observing that the
occupants were Hispanic and the vehicle had out-of-state license
plates.

The driver was cited for following too closely.

A

subsequent search based on a claim of consent revealed a kilogram
of

cocaine.

The trial court

found

the stop pretextual and

granted defendant's motion to suppress the evidence.

On appeal,

this court reversed the trial court, having found that the search
was supported by consent.
On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reversed this court,
holding

that

analysis.

the validity of

a consent

turns on a two-step

First, the consent must have been voluntarily given,

and, second, it must not have been obtained as a result of a
prior police misconduct.
remanded
whether

the
the

case

for

defendant's

See id. at 15.
an

evidentiary

consent

was

The court, therefore,
hearing

in

fact

to

determine

voluntary

and

untainted by police misconduct.
Similarly, in State v. Robinson, 140 UAR 16
1990),

one

of

the

issues

raised

by

the defendants

(Ct. App.
was the

voluntariness of the consent given to search the vehicle which
the

defendants

were

driving.

The court
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concluded

that the

consent to search was not voluntary.

A review of the facts in

Robinson will show that it is analogous to the facts in the
instant case.
In Robinson, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Anthony Garcia
made a traffic stop of a gray van on April 12, 1988.

After

making the stop, Garcia spoke with the driver of the van, Mr.
Towers, who produced a valid California driver's license.

The

passenger, Mr. Robinson, produced the registration, which showed
that neither occupant was the owner of the van.

At this point

Trooper Garcia and Trooper Ogden (who arrived after the stop was
made) questioned the occupants about the registration.
indicated

that the vehicle was owned by

their boss who had

allowed them to take it on a trip to Wyoming.
checked for a stolen vehicle report on the van.
indication that it was stolen.

Robinson

Trooper Garcia
There was no

The troopers then asked if the

defendants were carrying any weapons, currency or narcotics and
the defendants responded " n o /
The troopers next requested that the defendants consent to
a search of the van.

When the rear doors of the van were opened

by Robinson, the troopers observed a bed on a wooden platform.
When asked what was under the platform, Robinson stated that it
was their boss' property.
to the compartment.

The troopers asked how to gain access

Robinson indicated that it was through the
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side door and further indicated that the door was jammed.

Garcia

then opened the door and requested to take the base of the bed
apart.

When

indicated

Robinson

refused

that

request,

they would obtain a search warrant.

the

troopers

Subsequently,

Robinson agreed to allow a dog to go through the van.

The dog

alerted at the rear of the bed and a large quantity of marijuana
was found.

The trial court found that the defendants agreed to

the search.
In

addressing

the

consent

issue,

this

court

cited

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), noting that the
voluntariness issue must be resolved based on a totality of the
circumstances.

In doing so this court noted that the test "must

take into account both the details of police conduct and the
characteristics of the accused."

Robinson, at 19.

Additionally,

this court stated that, even if the consent is voluntary, it must
not be obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality.
Id., citing Arroyo.
In analyzing these facts, this court stated:
Here, the defendants were first questioned
about their right to possession of the van during
the brief, initially invalid traffic stop.
Once
the legal basis for that stop ended, after a short
period of detention, they were nonetheless not free
to leave. They were detained and questioned about
matters other than the traffic violation on the
side of the interstate by two armed police officers
with apparent, though false, authority to do so,
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then ordered by one trooper to remain at the van
and await his return.
They complied with his
commands. Next, they were questioned about whether
they were carrying any contraband and asked to
consent to a search of the vehicle.
There is no
evidence that Robinson was aware or was informed
that he did not have to accede to the trooper's
request. . . .
At that time, it was apparent that
the defendants would be kept in that custodial
environment until the troopers satisfied their
curiosity about the contents of the van, particularly the area under the bed. In light of the
troopers1 questioning and conduct, the coercive
atmosphere at the time, and the other surrounding
circumstances, we conclude that the State has not
borne its burden of proving that Robinson's consent
to search the vehicle was voluntary.
State

v.

Robinson,

p.

19-20

(citation

ommitted

and

emphasis

added).
There
instant

are

certain

critical

case and Robinson.

In the

similarities

between

the

instant case, the officers

stopped appellant at the airport without a reasonable suspicion
See Sery.

The officers then ostensibly obtained a consent to

search appellantfs bag and subsequently his person.
submits

that

unequivocal
was

never

the

nor

to search

intelligently given.

informed

officers' request
consent

consent

that

he

did

to search.

is found voluntary,

not

in this

Robinson.

to

neither

Appellant

accede

Further, even

it was obtained

sequence of the illegal stop.

case was

See Marshall.
have

Appellant

to

the

if the

as a direct

con-

The time proximity between when

the officer illegally stopped the defendant and when he obtained
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the "consent" was so close as to have tainted the consent.

See

United States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598 (1981) (even assuming that
defendant's consent was voluntarily given, the evidence must be
suppressed if not sufficiently attenuated from the prior misconduct, because to rule otherwise "would encourage police officers
to ignore the dictates of the fourth amendment").
cases

cited

heretofore,

this

court

should

Based on the

find

appellant's

alleged consent to the search involuntary and obtained via prior
police misconduct.

Arroyo; Robinson.

Appellant's conviction

must, therefore, be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The seizure of the evidence in the instant case lacked
reasonable suspicion or consent and was accomplished in violation
of

appellant's rights described

Amendments

to

the United

in the Fourth and Fourteenth

States Constitution

and Article

Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah.

I,

This court

should therefore, vacate appellant's conviction and sentence and
order that said evidence be suppressed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of August, 1990.

RONALD J. YENGICH
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

Case No. 891901201

v.
RODNEY DONALD CARTER,

Honorable Michael R. Murphy
Defendant.
The

above-entitled

matter

came on

regularly

for

hearing

before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy on the 11th day of December,
1989.

The State of Utah was represented by its attorney, GREGORY

M. WARNER, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, and the defendant was
present

and

represented

ESQUIRE.

The

Court

testimony

presented

by

having
by

the

his

counsel,

duly

considered

parties

RONALD

together

the
with

J.

YENGICH,

evidence
the

and

party's

argument thereon, now makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The

police considered

defendant
to be

deplaned

from

an

airline

which

from an area of origin where drugs were

considered available.
2.

the

As the defendant deplaned, he scanned the crowd.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 891901201
Page two

3-

As

the

defendant

proceeded

down

the

corridor, he

looked back at least three times.
4.
the

first

The

phone

defendant went

bank

available,

to a phone bank which was not
but

was

the

second

phone

bank

available,
5.

As

the defendant was at the phone bank, he looked

away from the police officer who had gone to the telephone next to
the one the defendant was using, and it is the Court's finding that
the officers involved had no ability to actually perceive what the
defendant was doing.
6.
airport

and

The defendant next proceeded toward the exit of the
walked

fast

down

an __eJLev-a-fctrr rather

than

remaining

stationary,
7.

The defendant was carrying

a type of a duffle bag

which appeared to be empty.
8.

The defendant did not have checked bags.

9.

The defendant proceeded directly to a cab stand and

hailed a cab.
10.

The defendant approached the taxi.

He had engaged

the taxi, had placed his bag into the back seat and was contacted
by an officer who told him he was a police officer, and asked the
defendant if he would speak with him.
11.
location

The defendant was asked to talk to the officer in a

approximately

20 feet from the taxi, at which

officers began to ask the defendant questions.

point the

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 891901201
Page three

12.
enforcement

The defendant was asked
personnel

and

the

for

defendant

identification

was

unable

to

by law
produce

identification.
13.
airline

The

ticket

defendant's

used

on

duffle

a previous

bag

flight

was

searched

in the

name

and

of

an

Warren

Carter was revealed.
14.

Officer

Fullmer

detected

a line

just

at or

above

the defendant's waist but under his outer clothing, but was unable
to

determine

what

material

caused

such

line

on

the

defendant's

clothing.
15.

A pat down search was conducted by Officer Fullmer

of the defendant and a bulge or bulges was found on the defendant
at the time of such pat down.
16.
tape which

The defendant lifted his shirt and exposed masking

extended

down

into his pants

and which

the

defendant

indicated to the law enforcement personnel was for medical purposes.
17.

The

defendant

was

returning

from

Nevada

and

had

just a day or so before gone from Salt Lake to Las Vegas, which he
demonstrated by the ticket stub that was produced by the defendant.
18.

The

shirt exposing

defendant

the masking

freely

and

tape strapped

voluntarily

raised

around his body

his

and the

Court finds that the defendant freely and voluntarily consented to
the police requests at least through the point of his voluntarily
raising

his

shirt

and disclosing

to the police

the masking

tape

that was bound around the trunk of his body. T V "U^ <^s <* * ^ c "tyfc

n
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19.
matter

of

The

the Court

police officers.
the

Court's

testimony

determination

perfunctorily

of

the

facts was

accepting

the

testimony

not a
of

the

The Court listened to both officers testimony and

of

the

defendant,

and

after

further

reading

the

Transcript in lieu of a preliminary hearing previously submitted by
counsel for the purpose of the hearing, the Court feels confident
in crediting the testimony of the officers in this case.
WHEREFORE,

having

heretofore

entered

its

Findings

of

Fact, the Court now makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The

Court

specifically

discredits

the

officers

ability to form a reasonable articulate suspicion prior to the time
of

the

defendant's

failure

to

provide

an

identification

upon

request.
2.

The Court concludes that the absence or the failure

of the defendant to produce identification also was not by itself,
or in the aggregate with the previously listed factors, sufficient
to indicate a reasonable articulable suspicion.
3.

The

Court

further

concludes

that

the

officer

perception of a line just at or above the defendants

waist, but

under

articulable

his

suspicion

outer
by

clothing,

itself

or

The

Court

in

was

not

combination

a

reasonable

with

anything

previously

noted.
4.

further

concludes

that

the

pat

down

search and observations made by the officers, including the feeling

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 891901201
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of

the

bulge,

at

that

time

was

not

sufficient

to

constitute a

reasonable suspicion either alone or in the aggregate.
5.

The

Court

gives

no weight

individually

or

in the

aggregate to those factors other than the lack of identification in
conjunction

with

the

lifting

of

the

defendant's

shirt

and

his

explanation as to the tape on his body.
6.
freely

and

least

The

Court

voluntarily

through

the

concludes,

consented

point

of

however,

that

to everything

voluntarily

the

that

raising

defendant

went

his

on, at

shirt

and

disclosing to the police what was around the trunk of his body and
further

that

the

pat

down

search

was

a

free

and

voluntary

concludes

that

a

combination

consensual search.
7.

The

Court

of

the

defendant's lack of identification under the circumstances where he
was at the airport returning from Nevada and had just a day or so
gone

from

Salt

Lake

to

Las

Vegas,

which

was

demonstrated

voluntarily by the ticket stub that was produced by the defendant,
and

in

raising

combination
his

shirt

with

the

wherein

defendant

the

freely

defendant

and

stated

that

voluntarily
what

was

strapped around his body was merely for medical purposes, and the
observation of the police at that time that the taping was other
than what is normally used in medical settings, and the fact that
the

taping

was

below

the

rib

cage,

gave

rise

to

reasonable

articulable suspicion that the defendant was involved in crime, and

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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therefore, from that point forward, law enforcement personnel were
able to or had a right to interfere with the defendant's liberty.
/

DATED this ___/_£_ day of January, 1990.

BY THE COURT:

/v

HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY
Third District Court Judge

Aanxoved as to Form

Ronald J. Yen
GMW/sc/0019

